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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20020359-CA 
vs. 
LAVAR T. JENSEN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for violation of a protective order, a class 
A misdemeanor codified at Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-108 (1999), in the Third 
District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction of appeals from misdemeanor convictions under Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is "proper service" an element of the violation of a protective order offense 
and, if so, did the State present sufficient evidence to prove proper service? 
What elements constitute an offense is a question of statutory interpretation, 
reviewable for correctness. See Murray City v. Culley, 1998 WL 1758314, *1 
(Utah App. 1998) (memorandum opinion) (attached in Addendum A). 
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"When reviewing a jury verdict on an insufficiency of the evidence argument, 
[the appellate court] view[s] the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, f 19, 999 P.2d 565 
(citation omitted). The court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing 
the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
verdict," the court finds that "'the evidence to support the verdict was completely 
lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust.'" Id. "So long as some evidence and reasonable 
inferences support the jury's findings, [the court] will not disturb them." Id. 
2. Where the prosecutor provided a gender-neutral explanation for her 
peremptory challenge of male jurors, did she violate the equal protection mandates 
of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986), and its progeny? 
"The trial court's conclusion as to whether or not a prima facie case was 
established is a legal determination . . . review[ed] for correctness, according it no 
particular deference." State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 459 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). However, the trial court's determination as to 
whether the opponent of the peremptory strike has proved purposeful discrimination 
"generally turns on the credibility of the proponent of the strike and will not be set 
aside unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 
(Utah 1996); accord State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, U 5, 41 P.3d 1153. 
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3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion 
for a continuance? 
Review of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a continuance is for an 
abuse of discretion. See Seel v. Van Der Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998); 
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). Error is reversible only if 
"sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant in its absence." Seel, 971 P.2d at 926 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statute is included in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-108 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with violation of a protective order, a 
class A misdemeanor codified at Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-108 (1999), and 
threat against life or property, a class B misdemeanor codified at Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-5-107 (1999). R. 3. Defendant pled not guilty. R. 15. 
On October 16, 2001, the court dismissed the count charging threat against life 
or property, but conducted a jury trial on the count charging violation of a 
protective order. R. 82. The jury returned a guilty verdict. Id. On April 1, 2002, 
the court entered judgment and sentenced defendant to a one-year jail term. R. 96. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 98. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 25, 1999, defendant and Jolynne Thomas appeared at a hearing on her 
petition for a protective order. State's Exhibit 1 (R. 112) (protective order) 
(attached in Addendum C). On that date, a protective order was filed. Id. It bears 
defendant's signature and the signatures of the district court judge and the district 
court commissioner. Id. Defendant's signature on the document attests his 
acceptance of service and the waiver of his right to any other personal service. Id. 
On May 29, 2001, defendant arrived at Jolynne Thomas's residence, one of the 
two units in a duplex, and knocked on her door. R. 110:78. When no one came 
out, he walked over to the adjoining unit where Jeremy Johnson lived. Id. While 
defendant was visiting with Mr. Johnson, Ms. Thomas exited her home, got into her 
car, pulled out of the driveway, and began to drive away. Id. Defendant got into 
his car and drove after her. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. This court has previously determined that service is not an element of the 
violation of a protective order offense. In any case, the State presented evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that defendant had been served. 
2. The prosecutor's explanation for her peremptory strikes—that she was 
trying to remove venire persons who had been involved in protective order 
cases—together with her accurate observation that males are more often 
respondents than females—was gender-neutral. Alternatively, the trial court 
4 
properly concluded no equal protection violation occurred because the prosecutor 
would have stricken the challenged jurors simply because they had been involved in 
protective order cases and without consideration of the fact that males are more 
often respondents than females. 
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's 
motion for a continuance to secure the attendance of the victim in this case. 
Defendant did not show that he could have produced the witness. Further, he 
conceded that he had not subpoenaed the witness. He therefore had not exercised 
due diligence prior to his request for a continuance. Finally, defendant was not 
prejudiced. Defendant presented the evidence he hoped to elicit from the victim 
through the uncontradicted testimony of his other witnesses. Defendant has not 
shown a reasonable likelihood that the trial result would have been different had the 
continuance been granted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
WHILE THE STATE MUST SHOW THAT DEFENDANT 
INTENTIONALLY VIOLATED HIS PROTECTIVE ORDER, IT NEED 
NOT SHOW THAT HE WAS SERVED; IN ANY CASE, THE STATE 
PRESENTED EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
SERVED 
Defendant first argues that "the State did not make a prima facie showing that 
[he] was served with the protective order that he is accused of violating." Br. Aplt. 
at 11. 
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Protective order hearing. Defendant was convicted of violating a protective 
order. The protective order at issue was filed in the district court on May 25, 1999, 
and a certified copy of the document was admitted at trial. State's Exhibit 1 
(R. 112); R. 110:73. The document indicates that the district court held a hearing 
on the matter on that date and that defendant appeared. State's Exhibit 1. The 
document further indicates that the defendant and the petitioner stipulated that 
domestic violence had occurred. Id. The document bears three signatures—the 
district court judge's, the district court commissioner's, and defendant's. Id. Both 
the judge's and the commissioner's signatures are dated May 25, 1999. Id. 
Defendant's undated signature follows this script: "By this signature, Respondent 
approves the form, and accepts service, of this Protective Order and waives the 
right to be personally served." Id. 
Trial. Defendant objected when the prosecutor first offered into evidence the 
certified copy of the protective order. He stated, "I'm going to object Surely to 
the part [of the protective order] where Judge Barrett signed is admissible. 
However page 5 is not. There is no foundation as to it. It has a signature 
[defendant's] on it" R. 110:71. The trial court, however, admitted the complete 
document. Id. at 73. 
Defendant later moved for a directed verdict. Id. at 84. He argued that the 
State had not met its "prima facie requirement^ . . . to prove that defendant had 
been properly served." Id. Defendant agreed that the certified copy of the 
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protective order was self-authenticating, but that "there was no foundation as to the 
signature, and there's no evidence that Mr. Jensen was actually served with it." Id. 
Defense counsel claimed that the State had the burden of bringing in the person 
who served the protective order on defendant or bringing in "someone that was 
actually here in Court that could testify that it was in fact [defendant], and in fact 
that he signed it." Id. at 86. Defense counsel continued, "We don't have a 
transcript or a video. We can't see for ourselves if in fact he was there, the one 
signing it. . . . I'd say that it's unreliable, and based on that it doesn't—it's 
insufficient to prove that he was served, because it has—the statute requires that he 
be properly served." Id. Defense counsel continued, arguing that there was 
"absolutely nothing to establish that this particular man here [defendant] is the same 
man who signed that document." Id. at 88. He argued that (1) there was no 
evidence that defendant was ever present at a protective order hearing, (2) ever 
knew of the protective order, or (3) was the same man named in the protective 
order. Id. at 89. 
The prosecutor responded, arguing that the protective order admitted into 
evidence was certified by a deputy clerk of the issuing court. Id. at 91. She 
continued, "The defense [c]ounsel can argue that the signature is not the 
defendant's signature, but I think for the prima facie case it's sufficient to say that 
defendant signed it." Id. at 91. 
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The trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict, holding that the State 
had established a prima facie case. Id. at 93. Defendant did not testify. See id. at 
2. 
Claim on appeal. On appeal, defendant renews his claim that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the conviction. In connection with this claim, defendant 
argues (1) that the State must show "proper service" because it is an element of the 
offense and (2) that the certified copy of the protective order bearing defendant's 
signature is insufficient to meet the State's burden of proof. Br. Aplt. at 23-25. 
Defendant's arguments on both points are without support. 
A. "Proper service" is not an element of the offense, and the State need not 
show proper service. Rather, the State must show that defendant 
intentionally violated the protective order. 
This Court has already determined that "service is [not] an element [of 
violating a protective order] that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order 
to convict [a defendant] of this offense." Murray City v. Culley, 1998 WL 
1758314, *1 (Utah App. 1998) (memorandum opinion) (attached in 
Addendum A).1 While the State is required to "prove a defendant'intentionally' 
violated a protective order," the State need not prove service. Id. at *1. "Proper 
{See Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, f 16, 44 P.3d 734 ("decisions of the 
court of appeals expressed in a memorandum decision, or in an opinion, are equally 
binding upon lower courts of this state, and may be cited to the degree that they are 
useful, authoritatively and persuasively"). 
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service of a protective order probably establishes the requisite mens rea of 
intentionality, but it is not the only means of doing so." Id. 
Because the State need not prove service, defendant's argument fails. 
Moreover, defendant does not argue that the State has failed to show an intentional 
violation and that issue is not before this Court. In any case, defendant's signature 
on the protective order is sufficient to support a finding that defendant knew of the 
protective order and that his violation was therefore intentional. 
B. Even if the State must show "proper service" as an element of the offense, 
the certified copy of the protective order bearing defendant's signature is 
sufficient to meet the State's burden of proof. 
Defendant intertwines two lines of argument in connection with his 
insufficiency claim. First, while he concedes that the certified copy of the 
protective order was properly authenticated and admissible, he claims that his 
signature on the protective order was not authenticated. Br. Aplt. at 11, 24-28 & 
n.6. Second, he argues that his signature on the protective order was not sufficient 
to show service. Id. at 27-28. Defendant's signature was, however, properly 
authenticated. Further, it was sufficient to show service. 
1. Defendant's signature on the certified copy of the protective order was 
properly authenticated. 
Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence, explains the requirement of authentication 
or identification. "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
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precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding 
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Utah R. Evid. 901(a). 
Authentication is, in essence, a relevancy issue and goes to admissibility. The 
relevancy of a writing or some other piece of evidence is "logically dependent upon 
the existence of some connection between that [evidence] and a particular 
individual." 2 John William Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 218 (4th ed. 1992). 
"The real question, however, is not whether such a connection is logically necessary 
for relevancy, but rather what standards are to be applied in determining whether 
the connection has been made to appear." Id. 
The standards are minimal See 3 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Federal Rules 
of Evidence Manual 1988 (7th ed. 1998) ("The requirements for authenticating 
evidence are not burdensome"). The proponent of the evidence need only make a 
prima facie showing that the evidence is what its proponent claims it to be. Utah R. 
Evid. 901(a); see also 5 Joseph M. McLaughlin et al., Weinstein's Federal Evidence 
§ 901.02[3] (2d. ed 2002). In other words, the proponent must introduce sufficient 
evidence to support a reasonable juror's conclusion that the evidence is what it 
purports to be. Id. at n.23 & cases cited therein. The proponent need not prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be, and he need not 
rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity. See United States v. 
Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 168 (1st Cir. 1994). Once the proponent has met this 
standard, the trial court should admit the evidence. Inconsistencies or flaws in the 
10 
authentication "go to the weight of the evidence instead of its admissibility/' and 
become issues for jury determination. See McLaughlin, § 901.02[3] n.25 and cases 
cited therein. 
In sum, rule 901 "does not require absolute certainty or conclusive proof." 
State v. Mays, 729 A.2d 1074, 1079 (N.J. Super. 1999). If a prima facie showing is 
made, the evidence comes in "and the ultimate question of authenticity is left to the 
jury." 2 John William Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 227 (4th ed. 1992). 
Here, the prosecution produced a certified copy of the protective order. The 
protective order indicates that defendant was in court on the day of his protective 
order hearing, that he signed the document, and that it was filed that day. The 
certified copy suffices to show both that the protective order and defendant's 
signature on the protective order are what they purport to be. 
In any case, defendant's signature was properly admitted as part of the 
certified copy of the protective order. Certified copies of public records are self-
authenticating. Utah R. Evid. 902. The evidence rules do not "require that each 
and every signature contained within an otherwise properly authenticated set of 
public documents be certified or embossed with a seal." People v. Martinez, 51 
P.3d 1029, 1033 (Colo. App. 2001); see also Utah R. Evid. 1005 ("The contents of 
an official record . . . may be proved by copy, certified as correct, in accordance 
with Rule 902"). 
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Further, defendant's authentication argument is not relevant to his claim on 
appeal. Despite his claim that his signature (or page 5 of the protective order) was 
not authenticated, defendant does not claim on appeal that the evidence was 
inadmissible. R. 110:71. Rather, he argues, as he also argued below, that lack of 
authentication renders the evidence insufficient. Br. Aplt. at 27-28. Defendant has 
pointed to no authority suggesting that failure to authenticate a piece of evidence 
renders the evidence insufficient to support a verdict. 
2. The certified copy of the protective order bearing defendant's signature is 
sufficient to show service. 
Defendant argues that "[t]he signature reading 'Lavar Jensen' could have been 
written by anybody" and that "[t]here is no assurance that [defendant] wrote the 
signature, read the protective order, or even saw the protective order." Br. Aplt. at 
28. Defendant therefore claims that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
finding that he had been properly served and that the signature on the protective 
order was his. Id. at 27-28. 
"When reviewing a jury verdict on an insufficiency of the evidence argument, 
[the appellate court] view[s] the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, f 19, 999 P.2d 565 
(citation omitted). The court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing 
the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
verdict/' the court finds that "'the evidence to support the verdict was completely 
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lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust.'" Id. "So long as some evidence and reasonable 
inferences support the jury's findings, [the court] will not disturb them." Id. 
Here, the protective order was the only trial evidence on this point. It 
indicates that defendant was present in court on the day of the hearing, stipulated 
that there were grounds to support issuance of the protective order, accepted 
service, and waived the right to any further service. State's Exhibit 1 (R. 112). 
Defendant did not testify and called no other witnesses to testify regarding this 
matter. Defendant has pointed to no authority that would support his contention 
that a certified copy of a protective order, bearing the signature of a respondent and 
filed in court, is legally insufficient to demonstrate service upon the respondent. 
While defendant was entitled to argue that someone else may have appeared in 
court and signed in his place, the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding 
that defendant did, in fact, appear and that service was accomplished. 
II. 
NO BATSON VIOLATION OCCURRED: THE PROSECUTOR 
PROVIDED A GENDER-NEUTRAL EXPLANATION FOR HER 
EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
Defendant next claims that the State improperly used its peremptory challenges 
to remove venire persons on the basis of gender. Br. Aplt. at 28-29. 
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Proceedings below. During voir dire, the trial court judge explained that this 
case involved the violation of a protective order and that the charge included an 
assault. R. 110:22. He then asked the following questions: 
• "Have you or a relative, that you're aware of, or a close friend, ever been 
accused of similar offenses?" Id. Mary Lee, Dallas Jolley, Tamra Earl, Gary 
Neilson, Russell Morley, and Debra Garrison responded affirmatively. Id. 
• "Have any of you been a victim of [a protective order violation or an 
assault]?" Id. at 22-23. Ms. Earl stated that she had. Id. at 23. 
• "Have any of you or your close friends or relatives that you're aware 
of. . . ever been a petitioner or a respondent in terms of a protective order?" 
Id. Mr. Jolley, Steven Smith, Ms. Earl, Mr. Neilson, and Ms. Garrison raised 
their hands.2 Id. 
• "Have any of you been involved in a domestic violence dispute either as a 
victim, a witness, or a defendant?" Mr. Jolley, Mr. Smith, Ms. Earl, Mr. 
Neilson, and Mr. Morley raised their hands. Id. at 24. 
The prosecutor and defense counsel each exercised three peremptory 
challenges to remove six jurors from the twelve-person venire, thereby selecting a 
six-person jury for this misdemeanor case.3 The following list summarizes the 
selection process: 
Juror 4, Carma Walker, seated; 
Juror 6, Mary Lee, removed (defendant's first peremptory); 
Jurror 7, Dallas Jolley, removed (prosecutor's first peremptory); 
Juror 8, Steven Smith, removed (prosecutor's second peremptory); 
Juror 9, Ruby Adamson, seated; 
2Brenda Hook and Ms. Mincher also raised their hands. R. 110:23. They 
were jurors number 20 and 21 and therefore not among the twelve-person venire from 
which the six-person jury was selected. 
^Jurors 1, 2, 3, and 5 were absent, and the trial court excused juror 14. 
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Juror 10, Bart Spjute, seated; 
Juror 11, Taralyn Barnwell, seated; 
Juror 12, Tamra Earl, removed (defendant's second peremptory); 
Juror 13, Gary Neilson, removed (prosecutor's third peremptory); 
Juror 15, Carolyn Byron, seated; 
Juror 16, Russell Morley, removed (defendant's third peremptory); and 
Juror 17, Debra Garrison, seated. 
R. 57-58. 
After each side had exercised its peremptory challenges, defense counsel 
challenged the prosecutor's strikes: "It appears that the State has struck three men 
from the jury, and pursuant to that I would ask if they can articulate some 
reason . . . why she struck three men, since it would be based on their sex." 
R. 110:31. 
The court then asked the prosecutor if she had some reason, other than gender, 
for her strikes. She stated: 
There certainly was, your Honor. I didn't even initially realize that 
all three of them were men, all three of my challenges were men until 
Mr. Bautista just pointed it out. I have on my notations that the three 
struck were part of the protective order, and logically I assumed that 
usually they would be on the defendant's side, since more . . . likely than 
not men are the respondents to protective orders, [rather] than 
women. . . . I also struck . . . the first male, because he was an engineer, 
I—my reasoning being that—I would want someone that fs less analytical. 
. . . and it kind of goes along with the next would be finance. I 
don ft think this is much of a science. . . . I wasn't looking for men to 
strike . . . and that's why I left Bart Sp[j]ute on. / was just going 
through. The next person that was part of a protective order was—the 
first one I have noted is Mr. Jolley. The one after that, he was part of a 
protective order. Then the defense struck Ms. Earl. She was part of a 
protective order, and then Mr. Neilson, the next one. 
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Id. at 32-33 (emphasis added). 
The trial court ruled that the prosecutor had articulated "an alternative to 
gender discrimination here." Id. at 34. Defense counsel countered, "She did say 
that men are the respondents. That was a generalization based on sex." Id. The 
court responded that all of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges were exercised 
against individuals involved in protective orders and that provided a basis other 
than gender for excluding the jurors. Id. The court observed that the capacity of 
their involvement, i.e., whether as victims, defendants, or witnesses, had been left 
open during voir dire. Id. 
Claim on appeal. Defendant reasserts his claim that the State improperly used 
its peremptory challenges to remove venire persons on the basis of gender. Br. 
Aplt. at 28-29. Defendant claims that the prosecutor "applied a sexual stereotype in 
deciding to remove two men, Mr. Steven Smith and Mr. Gary Neilson, from the 
venire." Id. at 29. The prosecutor, however, did not improperly discriminate on the 
basis of gender. The prosecutor articulated only gender-neutral reasons for her 
strikes. Alternatively, if the prosecutor articulated a gender-discriminatory reason 
for her strikes, trial court properly found that, absent the discriminatory motivation, 
the prosecutor would nonetheless have removed the two men from the venire. 
A. Equal protection limits the use of peremptory challenges. 
"Ordinarily, prosecutors have the freedom to base peremptory challenges on 
any reasons related to their views of the outcome of the case to be tried." State v. 
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Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 462 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
However, that privilege "is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection 
Clause;' Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986). Thus, 
"parties in a criminal action are prohibited from engaging in purposeful racial 
discrimination in exercising peremptory challenges of potential jurors." State v. 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 90, 106 
S.Ct. at 1719)); accord State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 14, 994 P.2d 177. Likewise, 
"the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis 
of gender, or on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case 
for no reason other than the fact that the person happens to be a woman or happens 
to be a man." J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994); 
accord State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, P.3d ; State v. Shepherd, 1999 
UT App 305, f 28, 989 P.2d 503. 
"Discrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes 
harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully 
excluded from participation in the judicial process." J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140, 114 
S.Ct. at 1427. As a result, "if purposeful discrimination is ultimately found, 
reversal of the defendant's conviction is mandated, without regard to the 
harmlessness of the constitutional error." State v. Macial, 854 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah 
App.) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 100, 106 S.Ct. at 1721), cert denied, 862 P.2d 
1356 (Utah 1993). 
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B. To determine whether peremptory strikes comply with equal 
protection principles, courts apply a three-step analysis. When a strike 
is exercised for both discriminatory and non-discriminatory reasons, 
courts must further determine whether the strike would have been 
exercised absent the improper motive. 
Under Batson and its progeny, trial courts engage in a three-step analysis for 
determining whether a party challenging a peremptory strike has demonstrated an 
equal protection violation: 
[0]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a 
prima facie case of [ ] discrimination, (step one), the burden of 
production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a 
[neutral] explanation (step two). If a [neutral] explanation is tendered, 
the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the 
strike has proved purposeful [ ] discrimination. 
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-71 (1995) (per curiam) 
(applying the analysis to race-based claims); accord, J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45, 
114 S.Ct. at 1429-30; Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir.), 
cert denied, — U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 228 (2001); Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547. 
Where the proponent of the strike proffers both a non-neutral and a neutral 
explanation, most courts conduct a dual motivation analysis. Dual motivation 
principles permit a strike, even where the proponent has articulated a non-neutral 
reason, if the proponent can demonstrate that she would have exercised the strike 
absent that non-neutral reason. See Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 234-235 (3d 
Cir. 2002), United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1530-1532 (8th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 
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417, 421-422 (4th Cir. 1995); Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 27-31 (2d Cir. 
1993); State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 544 (Conn. 1999); State v. Gattis, 1996 WL 
769328, *4 (Del. Super. 1996) (unpublished); People v. Hudson, 745 N.E.2d 1246, 
1256 (111. 2001); Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242 (Texas Crim. App. 2002) (en 
banc). 
1. Establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. 
Under the first step of the analysis, the party opposing the strike "must make 
out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of 
the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 
U.S. at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721; accord J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45, 114 S.Ct. at 
1429-30; Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 18. The purpose behind this first step is "to 
'separate meritless claims of discrimination from those that may have merit.'" State 
v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1994) (quoting United States v. Malindez, 962 
F.2d 332, 334 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 875, 113 S.Ct. 215 (1992)). This 
step "requires more than simply showing that one or more minority jurors were 
peremptorily stricken." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 777 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8, % 18. "[A]s a 
general rule, a 'defendant who requests a prima facie finding of purposeful 
discrimination is obligated to develop [some] record beyond numbers, in support of 
the asserted violation.'" Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 457 (quoting United States v. Brown, 
941 P.2d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 1991)); Colwell, 2000 UT 8,1 18. And "[w]hile 
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numerical evidence alone may be sufficient to establish a pattern of peremptory 
strikes against minority jurors, numerical evidence alone does not necessarily 
establish a prima facie case." Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, f 30 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
In addition to demonstrating that the excluded panel members "belong to a 
cognizable group," the opponent of the strike must show "that there exists 'a strong 
likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association 
rather than because of any specific bias.'" Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 456 (quoting State 
v. Cantu (Cantu II), 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989)); accord Shepherd, 1999 UT 
App 305, f 29. "To satisfy this burden, the opponent of the strike must create a 
record establishing sufficient evidence to support the allegation of purposeful [ ] 
discrimination." State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, J 8, 41 P.3d 1153. When 
determining whether the opponent has met his burden, the trial court "must 
undertake a 'factual inquiry9 that 'takes into account all possible explanatory 
factors' in the particular case." Batson, 476 U.S. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722 (citations 
omitted). For example, "a 'pattern' of strikes against [minority] jurors . . . might 
give rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions 
and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may 
support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 
106 S.Ct. at 1723; accord Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 455. 
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2. Offering a neutral explanation for the peremptory strike. 
Once the opponent of the strike makes a prima facie showing, the proponent 
"must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried/' 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724; accord J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45, 
114 S.Ct. at 1429-30. The proponent of a strike cannot satisfy step two "by merely 
denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith." 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. On the other hand, this second step 
"does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible." Id. at 768, 
115 S.Ct. at 1771; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (explaining 
that the explanation "need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for 
cause"). All that is required is an explanation that "does not deny equal 
protection." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. "Unless a discriminatory 
intent is inherent in the prosecutors explanation, the reason offered will be deemed 
[ ] neutral." Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). This is so because "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [] 
motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.4 Id. 
4In Batson, the Supreme Court explained that the proponent of the strike "must 
give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for 
exercising the challenges." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n.20 (citations 
omitted). Based on this language, Utah courts have concluded that the explanation by the 
proponent of the strike "must be '(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear 
and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate.'" Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548 (quoting 
Cantu //, 778 P.2d at 518). These latter two requirements, however, do not suggest that 
(continued...) 
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3. Proving purposeful discrimination. 
The third step requires the trial court to decide whether the opponent of the 
peremptory challenge has proved purposeful [ ] discrimination." Higginbotham, 
917 P.2d at 548; accord Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. In other words, 
the trial court must determine whether the proponent's "'explanation for a 
peremptory challenge should be believed.'" State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 156 
(Utah App. 1997) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 111 S.Ct. 
1859, 1869 (1991)). "[Tjhe question is not whether the prosecutor's explanation for 
the strike was factually correct, but whether it was a pretext to disguise a 
[discriminatory] motive." Id. at 156; accord Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549 n.3 
(holding that "a peremptory challenge can be made even for a mistaken reason so 
long as it is not racially motivated"). 
In this step, "the persuasiveness of the [proponent's] justification becomes 
relevant." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. As observed by the United 
States Supreme Court, "[a]t this stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may 
(and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination." Id. 
4(...continued) 
the explanation be plausible. As later explained by the Supreme Court in Purkett, they 
were simply "meant to refute the notion that a prosecutor could satisfy his burden of 
production by merely denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely affirming 
his good faith." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. In other words, "[w]hat is 
meant by a 'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not 
deny equal protection." Id. 
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'There will seldom be much evidence bearing on th[is] issue, and the best evidence 
often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge." 
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S.Ct. at 1869. Accordingly, "[i]n determining 
whether the peremptory challenge involved purposeful [ ] discrimination, the trial 
court must undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence of intent as may be available." Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, t 13 (internal 
quotes and citations omitted). Factors that may bear on the credibility of the 
explanation offered include the following: 
"(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the juror in question, 
"(2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory examination assuming neither 
the trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned the juror, 
"(3) singling the juror out for special questioning designed to evoke a certain 
response, 
"(4) the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the case, and 
"(5) a challenge based on reasons equally applicable to juror[s] who were not 
challenged." 
Bowman, 945 P.2d at 155-56 (quoting Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518-19) (paragraphing 
added). 
4. Demonstrating that the strike would have been exercised in the absence of 
the improper motivation—dual motivation analysis 
Finally, in the infrequent case where the proponent articulates both a neutral 
and a non-neutral explanation for her strike, most courts apply a "dual motivation" 
analysis. See Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 234-235 (3d Cir. 2002), United States 
v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 
1507, 1530-1532 (8th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421-422 (4th Cir. 
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1995); Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 27-31 (2d Cir. 1993); State v. Hodge, 
726 A.2d 531, 544 (Conn. 1999); State v. Gattis, 1996 WL 769328, *4 (Del. Super. 
1996) (unpublished); People v. Hudson, 745 N.E.2d 1246, 1256 (111. 2001); Guzman 
v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242 (Texas Crim. App. 2002) (en banc). Cf. People v. Howard, 
601 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (N.Y. County Court 1993). Dual motivation principles 
permit a strike, even where the proponent has articulated a non-neutral reason, if the 
proponent can demonstrate that she would have exercised the strike absent that non-
neutral reason. 
A few courts, however, refuse to consider the proponent's neutral reasons. See 
Ex Parte Sockwell, 675 So.2d 38, 40 (Ala. 1995); State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 
(Ariz. 2001); Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (S.C. 1998). Cf. Rector v. 
State, 444 S.E.2d 862, 863 (Ga. App. 1994); State v. King, 572 N.W.2d 530, 535 
(Wis. 1997). They reason that the proffered non-neutral reason "taints" any other 
neutral reason for the strike. 
This is an issue of first impression in Utah. For reasons detailed in the 
subsequent discussion, sound policy favors Utah's adoption of dual motivation 
principles, which have been adopted by the strong majority of courts, including 
every federal circuit court of appeal that has addressed the question. 
a. Dual motivation analysis 
Most courts considering the issue have held that a non-neutral reason for 
exercising a peremptory challenge is insufficient by itself, to show a Batson 
24 
violation if the proponent of the strike also articulates neutral reasons. "Dual 
motivation analysis grants the proponent of a strike the opportunity to raise an 
affirmative defense after the opponent of the strike has established a prima facie 
case of discrimination." Tokars, 95 F.3d at 1533 (citation omitted). "[T]o prove 
this affirmative defense, the proponent of the strike bears the burden of proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the strike would have been exercised even in 
the absence of the discriminatory motivation." Id. (citation omitted). In other 
words, having articulated both a neutral and a non-neutral explanation, the 
proponent "bears the burden of proof to persuade the trier that the challenges would 
have been exercised for [gender-jneutral reasons even if [gender] had not been a 
factor." Howard, 986 F.2d at 24. 
b. Taint analysis 
Several state courts, however, have held that any non-neutral reason for 
striking a juror taints the entire jury selection process. "Once a discriminatory 
reason has been uncovered . . . this reason taints any other neutral reason for the 
strike." See Lucas, 18 P.3d at 163 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Once a prosecutor has articulated any discriminatory purpose for a strike, removal 
of the juror taints the proceeding and requires reversal of any ensuing conviction. 
Id. Whether the prosecutor would have stricken the juror in the absence of the 
discriminatory purpose is irrelevant. See id. 
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c. Policy considerations 
Dual motivation analysis makes sense as a matter of policy. The purpose for 
peremptory challenges is to seat a fair and impartial jury. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 
137 n.8, 114 S.Ct. at 1426 n.8 ("only legitimate interest... in the exercise of 
[party's] peremptory challenge is securing a fair and impartial jury"). That purpose 
is thwarted if, once a prosecutor expresses a non-neutral motivation for striking a 
juror, the trial court has no choice but to seat the challenged juror, no matter how 
legitimate and compelling the prosecutor's other objections. 
Yet, courts that have rejected dual motivation analysis have not explained what 
action a trial judge should take where a proffered explanation for peremptory strikes 
includes both neutral and non-neutral bases. Rather, they have simply reversed 
convictions concluding that the jury selection was "tainted." Important questions 
remain unanswered. Must the trial judge immediately seat the juror, effectively 
jeopardizing the victim's and the people's interest in a fair trial, because the 
prosecutor has voiced a discriminatory motive? Should the judge, instead, release 
the venire and begin selection proceedings anew? What course should the trial 
judge take to avoid reversal? Courts adopting taint analysis have not addressed and 
apparently have not considered these questions. The lack of clear answers for them 
suggests the weakness of taint analysis. 
Further, courts adopting taint analysis inaccurately reason that dual motivation 
analysis erodes Batson's protection of the equal protection interest. Dual 
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motivation reasoning, however, does not undermine equal protection. "Dual 
motivation analysis has its roots in equal protection cases that hold than an action 
motivated in part by an impermissible reason will nonetheless be valid if the same 
action would have been taken in the absence of the impermissible motivation." 
People v. Hudson, 745 N.E.2d 1246, 1256 (111. 2001) (citing Tokars, 95 F.3d at 
1533 n.4). 
The Second Circuit, the first court to apply dual motivation analysis to 
peremptory strikes, looked to the Supreme Court's analysis of pre-Batson equal 
protection cases, including Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 22 (1976), Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp, 429 U.S. 252 
(1977), and Mt. Healthy City School Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 
(1977). In those cases, the Supreme Court articulated some guiding analytical 
principles: 
(1) "Racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause requires a 
racially discriminatory purpose." Guzman v. State, 85 SW.3d 242 (Texas 
2002) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
(2) "A plaintiff need not prove that the challenged action rested solely on 
racially discriminatory motives; rather the test is whether a discriminatory 
purposes has been a motivating factor in the decision." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
(3) "If the plaintiff shows that a discriminatory purpose motivated a decision 
in part, the defendant then bears the burden of establishing that he would 
have made the same decision if the discriminatory purpose had not been 
considered or had not existed." Id. 
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Under the dual-motivation analysis, then, a peremptory challenge cannot stand 
where the prosecutor would not have made the decision, absent a discriminatory 
purposes, even where the discriminatory purpose is only one—even a small one—of 
her motivations. Consequently, this analysis does not to jeopardize equal 
protection. Because dual motivation analysis is consistent with equal protection 
precedent and, at the same time, protects the people's interest in a fair trial, this 
Court should adopt the analysis for review of cases involving both neutral and non-
neutral motivations for peremptory challenges. 
C. The prosecutor's gave a neutral and nondiscriminatory reason for her 
peremptory challenges: she removed venire persons who had been 
involved in protective order cases. Further, her observation that men 
were more likely to have been respondents than women did not make her 
explanation discriminatory. 
1. The prosecutor properly used her peremptory challenges to eliminate 
venire persons who had been involved in protective order cases. 
The prosecutor in this case explained that she exercised her peremptory 
challenges in an effort to eliminate persons who had been involved in protective 
order cases. R. 110:32. She explained that she "was just going through" the list, 
eliminating in order the venire persons who had been involved in these cases. Id. at 
33. She also indicated a belief that males who have been involved in protective 
order cases are more likely than females to have been involved as respondents. Id. 
at 33. Respondents are, of course, alleged perpetrators who can be subjected to 
protective orders and charged as defendants if they violate those orders. 
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The desire to remove persons who have been involved in protective order 
cases is a nondiscriminatory motive for exercising a peremptory challenge. 
Likewise, the desire to remove persons who have been involved as respondents in 
protective order cases is a nondiscriminatory motive. Further, both motives are 
related to the purpose for peremptory challenges, e.g., to assure a fair and unbiased 
jury. SeeJ.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 n.8, 114 S.Ct. at 1426 n.8. 
The prosecutor's peremptory challenges were necessarily based on the 
information before her. Prior to striking the challenged jurors, the prosecutor had 
the following information about the venire persons: 
1. Ms. Lee, Mr. Jolley, Ms. Earl, Mr. Neilson, Mr. Morley, and Ms. 
Garrison, had either been accused of an assault or a protective order 
violation or had a close friend or relative who had. R. 110:22. 
2. Ms. Earl had been a victim of an assault or protective order violation, but 
no one else had. Id. at 22-23. 
3. Mr. Jolley, Mr. Smith, Ms. Earl, Mr. Neilson, and Ms. Garrison had 
either been a protective order petitioner or respondent or had a close 
friend or relative who had. Id. at 23. 
4. Mr. Jolley, Mr. Smith, Ms. Earl, Mr. Neilson, and Mr. Morley had been 
involved in a domestic violence dispute either as a victim, a witness, or a 
defendant. Id. at 24. 
The second and fourth items of information are the most relevant because they 
they address the involvement of the venire persons themselves and do not include 
possible involvement by others. Five of the twelve venire persons had been 
involved in domestic violence disputes as victims, witnesses, or defendants—Mr. 
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Jolley, Mr. Smith, Ms. Earl, Mr. Neilson, and Mr. Morley. Ms. Earl was the only 
one who had been involved as a victim. Id. at 22-23. The prosecutor could 
reasonably have concluded that the remaining four had been involved as witnesses 
or defendants in protective order hearings and/or cases involving protective order 
violations. 
The prosecutor's strikes are therefore consistent with a motive to remove those 
persons who had been involved in protective order cases. The prosecutor testified 
that she went down her list, deleting those who had been involved in protective 
order cases.5 Id. at 32-33. She exercised her first peremptory strike to remove the 
first of the five persons who had been involved, Mr. Jolley (juror 7). R. 57-58. 
Defendant then used his first peremptory challenge to remove Ms. Lee (juror 6). 
Id. The prosecutor then removed Mr. Smith (juror 8), the second of the five. Id. 
Defendant then removed Ms. Earl (juror 12), the third of the five. Id. The 
prosecutor skipped one male, Mr. Spjute (juror 10), who had not been involved in a 
protective order case. Id. Because defendant had used his second peremptory to 
remove Ms. Earl (juror 12), the prosecutor used her final peremptory strike to 
5The jury list does not indicate whether the prosecutor and defense counsel took 
turns exercising their peremptory challenges. Rule 18, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure, 
however, mandates that the two parties exercise their peremptory challenges "to one juror 
at a time in regular turn," beginning with the prosecutor. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(a)(2). The 
proceedings of the trial court are entitled to a presumption of regularity. See State v. 
Pooler, 2002 UT App 299, fflf 7-8, 56 P.3d 979. Also, the prosecutor's explanation for 
her peremptory strikes indicates that the prosecutor and defense counsel took turns. See 
R. 110:33. 
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remove Mr. Neilson (juror 13), the fourth of the five persons involved in protective 
order cases. Id. Defendant then struck Mr. Morely (juror 16), the fifth of the five. 
Id. The prosecutor did not skip the name of any venire person who had been 
involved in a protective order dispute as a victim, witness, or defendant. See id. 
The prosecutor's strategy was reasonable and non-discriminatory. She had no 
need to consider gender to effect her strategy. She never had to make a decision 
between a male juror and a female juror. Gender was therefore irrelevant to her 
determination. The record supports the trial judge's finding that the prosecutor 
exercised her peremptory challenges against individuals involved in protective 
orders. R.l 10:34. The trial judge also properly concluded that this was a basis 
other than gender for the strikes. Id. 
2. The prosecutor's statement that men are more likely to be respondents 
than women, if a factor in her decision, did not constitute gender 
discrimination. 
As explained in the preceding section, the prosecutor simply eliminated 
individuals who had been involved in protective order cases. The prosecutor did, 
however, observe that males are more often involved as respondents than females. 
That observation was surplusage. As explained in the foregoing section, the 
prosecutor never had to make a choice between a male and a female who had been 
involved in a protective order hearing. Even had she been moving down her list 
attempting to eliminate those jurors who had most likely been respondents, she 
would never have had to make a decision between a male and a female juror. 
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Further, even if her observation about the gender of respondents played a role 
in her decision-making, consideration of the fact that the vast majority of domestic 
violence perpetrators are male did not make her decision improperly discriminatory. 
Improper gender discrimination is generally based on some stereotypical idea about 
gender and not on facts or fact-based probabilities associated with gender. Such 
gender discriminatory treatment, not based on reason or fact, is not related to the 
purpose for peremptory challenges, i.e., to secure a fair and impartial jury. See 
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 n.8, 114 S.Ct at 1426 n. 8. Discrimination based on facts, 
on the other hand, is related to the purpose for peremptory challenges and is 
necessary to an informed decision. 
Here, the prosecutor's challenges were based on a gender-associated 
probability grounded in fact. It is clear that the vast majority of domestic violence 
perpetrator's are male—95% according to an American Bar Association report. See 
American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence, Report, at 
http://www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.html (last accessed November 20, 2002) 
(attached in Addendum D). Correspondingly, only a tiny minority of domestic 
violence perpetrators are female—5%. These are facts, not gender-based 
stereotypes.6 
Analogously, a trial court might ask in a rape case, whether any of the venire 
persons have been involved in a rape. If, as in this case, some males and some females 
should answer affirmatively, it would not be unreasonable or discriminatory for the 
(continued...) 
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Thus, assuming the prosecutor factored the 95% correlation between gender 
and perpetration into her decision, she did so properly. Her decision cannot be seen 
as based on gender stereotypes, but on two factually-based probabilities, the second 
of which was merely associated with gender: (1) those venire persons who have 
not been involved in protective order cases are less likely than others to have biases 
that may interfere with their ability to consider a case fairly, and (2) of those 
involved in protective order cases, those who are male are more likely to have been 
perpetrators/respondents than those who are female. Both were proper 
considerations in the prosecutor's exercise of her peremptory challenges. Thus, 
defendant's Batson claim fails. 
D. Even if this Court determines that the prosecutor's reference to the 
correlation between gender and respondent-status was improperly 
discriminatory, this Court should apply dual motivation analysis to 
conclude that the trial court properly permitted the strikes. 
Should this Court determine that the prosecutor proffered a gender-
discriminatory explanation for her peremptory strikes, it should apply dual 
motivation analysis to review the trial court's determination that she would have 
stricken the jurors only for gender-neutral reasons. 
6(.. .continued) 
prosecutor, in exercising her peremptory challenges, to take into account the fact that the 
vast majority of rape perpetrators are males and the vast majority of rape victims are 
females. 
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As explained in Point C.I., above, the prosecutor sought to eliminate persons 
who had been involved in domestic violence disputes. She "just went through" her 
list, eliminating those who had been involved. R. 110:33. As it turned out, she had 
no occasion to choose between a male and female who had been involved. The 
prosecutor therefore exercised her peremptory challenges without making a decision 
based on gender or even on a gender-associated probability. 
Moreover, the prosecutor indicated that she also considered the venire persons' 
analytical skills in making her determination. She stated that she struck the first 
two male jurors because she thought they might be too "analytical." R. 110:32-33. 
The first male, whose strike is not challenged, was an application engineer. Id. at 
14. The second male, whose strike is challenged, had a degree in business finance. 
Id. She then skipped a male who had not been involved in a protective order case 
and struck Gary Neilson, the third male, because he was part of a protective order 
case. Id. at 33. Thus, she provided a second, non-discriminatory purpose for 
striking Mr. Jolley, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Neilson. 
In conclusion, the record clearly supports a finding that the prosecutor would 
have made the same selection, even had she not considered the statistical 
probability that men were more likely domestic violence perpetrators. The Court 
should therefore determine that the trial court properly permitted the prosecutor's 
strikes. If this Court rejects the neutral basis found by the trial judge, it should 
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remand to the trial court to determine whether the prosecutor would have stricken 
the challenged jurors for the alternative reasons addressed in this Argument. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR A CONTINUANCE WAS NEITHER ERRONEOUS NOR 
PREJUDICIAL 
Defendant claims that the trial court's denial of his motion for a continuance to 
secure a witness constituted an abuse its discretion. Br. Aplt. at 43. 
Proceedings below. The State subpoenaed Ms. Thomas, the victim, but Ms. 
Thomas did not appear. R. 112:48. The prosecutor explained that the victim feared 
the defendant, that "it was kind of touch and go if she'd come or not," and that she 
had failed to appear. Id. Defense counsel stated that he did not subpoena the 
victim because he understood that the State had subpoenaed her. Id. at 43. 
Defendant asserted that if the victim had testified, he could have presented 
"inconsistent statements" that she had made or may have gotten her to acknowledge 
certain statements that she had allegedly made. Id. at 43-44. Defense counsel 
claimed that the victim was "trying to set [defendant] up," had made inconsistent 
statements to the police, and had told defendant that the protective order had been 
dismissed. Id. at 50, 52. Defendant claimed that without the victim's testimony, he 
could not present a defense. Id. at 44. 
Claim on appeal. Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion 
when it denied his motion for a continuance and thereby "crippled" his defense. Br. 
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Aplt. at 43-50. Defendant, however, has not shown that the witness could have 
been produced or that he exercised due diligence before requesting a continuance. 
Further, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the denial of the 
continuance. 
A defendant moving for a continuance to procure the testimony of an absent 
witness "must show that the testimony sought is material and admissible, that the 
witness could actually be produced, that the witness could be produced within a 
reasonable time, and that due diligence has been exercised before the request for a 
continuance." State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). Further, on 
appeal, defendant must show that he was "materially prejudiced by the court's 
denial of the continuance or that the trial result would have been different had the 
continuance been granted." State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991). 
A. Defendant has not shown that his witness could actually have been 
produced within a reasonable time. 
Defendant has not shown that the witness could have been produced. 
Defendant has not suggested any reason why he might have been more successful 
than the State in procuring the victim's appearance as a witness. 
B. Defendant has not shown that he exercised due diligence before requesting 
the continuance. 
Defendant argues that he relied on his understanding that the State had 
subpoenaed the witness. Br. Aplt. at 47. That does not constitute due diligence. If, 
indeed, defendant wished to call the witness to testify in his behalf, he should have 
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taken steps to procure her attendance. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 
1225, 1230 (5th Cir. 1991) (failure to subpoena important defense witness when 
available constitutes lack of due diligence); State v. Snyder, 750 So.2d 832, 858 
(La. 1999) ("Generally, the 'due diligence' requirement... is not satisfied when 
defense counsel fails to have the potential witness subpoenaed."). Kirkland v. Ellis, 
920 P.2d 206 (Wash. App. 1996) ("a continuance is improper when the moving 
party has failed to exercise due diligence in issuing subpoenas for necessary 
witnesses"). 
C Defendant has not shown prejudice. 
Defendant has not shown that he was materially prejudiced by the denial of 
the continuance or that the trial result would have been different had the 
continuance been granted. Defendant speculates that the victim would have 
testified that she had a continuing relationship with defendant following the entry of 
the protective order and that she had informed him that the protective order had 
been dismissed. Br. Aplt at 44. Defendant apparently claims that this testimony 
would have shown that he believed the protective order had been dismissed and that 
he therefore could not have intentionally violated it. Id. 
Defendant merely speculates that the witness would have testified to these 
facts. In any case, defendant, who exercised his right not to testify, presented 
witnesses who testified to the facts he hoped to elicit from the witness. Defendant's 
friend, Brandon Monthey, testified that defendant had told him of the protective 
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order, that he had later seen defendant and Ms. Thomas together, and that Ms. 
Thomas had stated in defendant's presence that the protective order had been lifted. 
R. 110:107-110. Defendant's sister, Laurie Wagers, also testified that she had seen 
defendant and Ms. Thomas together in approximately December 2000. Id. at 114. 
Further, the prosecutor never argued that defendant had not seen Ms. Thomas 
after the protective order issued or that Ms. Thomas had not told defendant that the 
protective order had been lifted. Rather, the prosecutor argued that it would have 
been unreasonable to conclude "that the defendant would simply rely on Jolynn 
Thomas' assertion that the protective order had gone away." Id. at 138. She 
argued that defendant's conduct was knowing and intentional because he knew that 
the protective order had issued and it would not have been "reasonable for him to 
believe that the protective order had been lifted, relying on the victim's alleged 
behavior." Id. at 139. 
Thus, defendant has not demonstrated that he was "materially prejudiced by 
the court's denial of the continuance or that the trial result would have been 
different had the continuance been granted." Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476. He was 
allowed to present his defense to the jury. The prosecutor did not refute the 
evidence, presented through other witnesses, that defendant sought to present 
through the unavailable victim-witness. The jury, nonetheless, found defendant's 
conduct knowing and intentional, apparently believing that it would not have been 
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reasonable for defendant to rely on assertions by the victim, if any, that the 
protective order had been lifted. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
SAN PETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TATE OF UTAH, by and through - ; 




EGGY SUE STREIGHT, by and through ; )RVAL (BUD) AND KAREN JENSEN, ; 
,er conservators and guardians, et. al ] 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
) STATE OF UTAH 
) Civ. No. 990600417 
) Judge K. L. Mclff 
PlaintifFS Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came before this court on May 9,2001. 
Stephanie M. Saperstein, Assistant Attorney General appeared on behalf of plaintiff State of 
Utah, Office of Recovery Services. Robert B. Sykes appeared on behalf of defendants Robert B. 
Sykes and Associates and Peggy Sue Streight. The court, having heard oral argument and 
considered the matter fully, 
HEREBY ORDERS: 
1. The plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted as a full summary 
^ *7i q r}z 
C ' 
-—• EFUTT 
judgment. The reasons for this judgment are stated in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated 
May 18, 2001 which is incorporated herein by reference and attached as Addendum A. 
2. No genuine issue of material fact exists. The undisputed material facts are set forth 
in the Memorandum Decision. 
3. The plaintiff is granted a judgment against the defendants in the amount of 
$107,363.70 plus interest for the full reimbursement of Medicaid payments made on behalf of 
Peggy Streight. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-7-2(b), defendant Robert B. Sykes and 
Associates shall be responsible for the amount of $38,030.92 of that judgment. Peggy Sue 
Streight, by and through her conservators and guardians Orval (Bud) and Karen Jensen shall be 
responsible for the amount of $69,332.78 of that judgment. 
2 
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PEGGY SUE STREIGHT, by and through 
ORVAL (BUD) AND KAREN JENSEN, her 
conservators and guardians, et aL, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 990600417 
Assigned Judge: K. L. McIFF 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes before the court on the motion of the State of Utah for partial summary 
judgment. The State, by and through the Office of Recovery Services, seeks an order that the 
defendant, Peggy Sue Streight (hereafter "Streight"), should reimburse the State $107,363.70 for 
medical expenses paid in her behaif. The reimbursement would come from $110,000 insurance 
proceeds Streight received in settlement of a tort claim. Of the said sum, $38,030.92 was paid to 
defendants Robert B. Sykes and Associates (hereafter "Sykes and Associates") as attorney's fees. 
The State also asks that Sykes and Associates be compelled to disgorge this sum as part of the 
proceeds which must be paid to the State. The issues have been extensively briefed; documentary 
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ience has been supplied and the court heard oral argument. Relevant undisputed facts and the 
irt's legal analysis follow. 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
The undisputed material facts include those set forth in numbered paragraphs. Other 
disputed facts, to the extent deemed relevant, will be incorporated in the court's legal analysis. 
1- On June 9, 1998, Streight was severely injured in an auto/pedestrian accident in 
Gunnison, Utah. The injuries detrimentally impacted Streight's mental capabilities. 
2- Streight was a pedestrian in the accident. The automobile which hit Streight was 
driven by Sheriiyn Christenson. 
3- Sheriiyn Christenson was insured by Utah Farm Bureau with policy limits of 
$100,000. Streight also had $10,000 underinsured motorist coverage with Ohio 
Casualty Insurance Co. 
4- Streight lacked the funds to pay her medical expenses incurred as a result of the. 
accident. 
5- On June, 17, 1998, eight days after the accident, Oival I. (Bud) Jensen, Streight's 
father, applied for medical assistance from the State of Utah on behalf of Streight 
6- On June 26, 1998, Orval Jensen completed and filed a questionnaire supplying 
information regarding Sheriiyn Christenson, the driver of the vehicle, and her 
insurance carrier. 
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7- On Aug. 3, 1998, Orvai Jensen filed an additional application for medical and other 
benefits. The application contained an assignment, in favor of the State, of all 
insurance proceeds and all payments from parties liable for Streight's medical 
expenses. 
8- Streight was deemed eligible for medical assistance in the form of Medicaid 
beginning June 1, 1998, though actual approval occurred later. 
9- In August 1998, Orvai Jensen retained the services of Sykes and Associates to 
pursue recovery for Streight. Jensen advised Sykes of the application for Medicaid 
benefits. 
10- On August 25, 1998, Streight's Medicaid application was formally approved 
11- On Sept. 17, 1998, Sykes and Associates filed in the Sixth District Court of 
Sanpete County a petition for appointment of conservator and approval of 
settlement of Streight's claim against the driver of the car, her insurer and against 
Streight's underinsured motorist carrier. 
12- Six days later on Sept. 23, 1998, the petition came before the district court, and 
the Honorable David L. Mower entered an order approving appointment of 
conservator, settlement and execution of release and establishing a "special needs 
trust." 
13- The court order approved settlement against the driver and her insurance carrier 
Utah Farm Bureau for the policy limit of $100,000. 
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14- The order also approved a settlement for underinsured motorists coverage with 
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. for the policy limit of $10,000. 
15- Finally, the court order approved attorney's fees and costs in favor of Sykes and 
Associates in the amount of $38,030.92. 
16- Streight, her conservators and attorneys, failed to obtain the written consent of the 
State before filing and settling the claims. 
17- On September 28, 1998, some five days after obtaining court approval of the 
settlement and creation of the special needs trust, Streight's conservators 
contacted the Office of Recovery Services requesting a copy of medical bills pakL 
up to that date on behalf of Streight. 
18- On Sept. 30, 1998, the Office of Recovery Services responded to the request by 
faxing an itemized list of the medical bills paid totaling some $58,000. 
19- As of January 16, 1999, the State had paid $107,363.70 for medical care received 
by Streight between June 10 and October 16, 1998. 
20- The State has made demand of the defendant Streight and co-defendant Sykes and 
Associates for the monies obtained from the third parties up to the extent of the 
$107,363.70 Medicaid benefits paid. Both said defendants have refused and 
continue to refuse to forward these proceeds. 
21- Under date of Nov. 22, 1999, the State filed the within action. 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
This case arises under Utah's Medical Benefits Recovery Act, Utah Code Annotated 
§§26-19-1 etseq. The statutory scheme entitles the State to reimbursement by operation of law 
when it provides or becomes obligated to provide medical assistance on behalf of a recipient: 
26-19-4.5. Assignment of rights to benefits. 
(1) (a) To the extent that medical assistance is actually provided to a recipient, all benefits 
for medical services or payments from a third party otherwise payable to or on behalf of a 
recipient are assigned by operation of law to the department if the department provides, 
or becomes obligated to provide, medical assistance, regardless of who made application 
for the benefits on behalf of the recipient [Emphasis added.] 
The State may recover directly from a third party and has a lien against uany proceeds'7 recovered 
by the recipient. The recipient may pursue a separate action for loss or damage not included in 
the State's action: 
26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third party - Lien - Notice - Action -
Compromise or waiver - Recipient's right to action protected. 
(1) (a) When the department provides or becomes obligated to provide medical assistance 
to a recipient because of an injury, disease, or disability that a third party is obligated to 
pay for, the department may recover the medical assistance directly from that third party, 
(b) The department's claim to recover medical assistance provided as a result of the injury, 
disease, or disability is a lien against any proceeds payable to or on behalf of the 
recipient by that third party. 
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an action by a recipient or a 
dependent of a recipient for loss or damage not included in the department's action. 
[Emphasis added.] 
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ore pursuing a claim or settlement, the recipient is required to obtain the State's written 
tsent and if recovery is obtained and distributed the State may obtain reimbursement from the 
ipient or any other party who received any of the proceeds: 
26-19-7. Action or claim by recipient - Consent of department required. . • • 
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle, compromise, 
release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of medical costs for an injury, 
disease, or disability for which the department has provided or has become obligated to 
provide medical assistance, without the department's written consent. 
(2) (a). -
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party to which the 
proceeds were made payable all medical assistance which it has provided and retains its 
right to commence an independent action against the third party, subject to Subsection 
26-19-5(3). [Emphasis added.] 
By reliance on the foregoing, the State argues that it is entitled to summary judgment 
equiring reimbursement of the full $107,363.70 it has paid including the $38,030.92 paid to 
Jykes and Associates. Defendants have thrown up a number of defenses, but most of them have 
lot been seriously pursued.1 The defenses and arguments that have been briefed and which have 
some arguable substance will be discussed. 
1
 Defendants have set forth, inter alia, the defenses that plaintifTs claims are barred by its failure to have 
a federally mandated hardship waiver available to medicaid recipients (5* defense), that plaintiffs claims and 
actions are violative of and thus barred by the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of the State of Utah (6th defense), that plaintifTs claims and actions are violative of and thus barred by 
the due process and open courts clauses in the Untied States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
None of these arguments have been developed or briefed in any manner and none are considered meritorious. 
Sykes and Associates spent some time claiming the State is prejudiced against its law firm and refuses to approve 
its pursuing cases such as this. Reliance is placed on other unrelated cases. The State disputes the allegations. So 
far as this case is concerned, that debate is a "red hemng." Sykes and Associates will have to find a different 
forum to air its grievances with the State. 
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A. RECOVERY OF OTHER THAN "MEDICAL COSTS" 
Perhaps the most consequential argument advanced by defendants is that they did not 
pursue recovery of "medical costs" and that, therefore, they were not required to obtain the 
department's written consent as required in UCA §26-19-7 (l)(a) set forth above. The argument 
is finely tuned and the underlying facts reflect a carefully structured effort to bypass the 
requirement of State consent. 
Defendants focus on subsection (5) of UCA §26-19-5, which protects the right of an 
injured person to pursue recovery for uloss or damage not included" in the State's claim. The 
argument is to the effect that the State can only recover "medical costs" or "medical expenses19 
which it has provided or has become obligated to provide and that its lien only applies to a 
recovery so labeled. The argument assumes that a recipient can massage a settlement so the State 
is excluded from the picture. It is claimed that no notice need be given the State where an injured 
party seeks only to recover for losses other than medical costs. 
Defendants' argument is not new. An identical argument was raised years ago in Camp v. 
Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Camp, however, did not folly 
answer the question presented here because the settlement included some "medical costs." Camp 
had argued that since UCA §26-19-7(l)(a) is limited to "medical costs" it impliedly means that 
consent need not be obtained where recovery is for other damages. The court side-stepped the 
ultimate issue, ruling: 
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"It is unnecessary here for us to determine whether Camp's interpretation is correct. The 
affidavit of Farmers' Insurance adjustor contains a statement that the settlement was for all 
legally recoverable damages, including medical expenses. Once a Medicaid recipient 
proceeds with a claim against a third party without State consent, and the claim includes 
medical expenses, as here, then subsection 26-19-7(2) applies." [Emphasis added.] 
79 P.2d at 246. The court, however, went on to hold that the State's lien extended to all the 
roceeds not just the medical expense portion: 
"This subsection provides that the State is entitled to reimbursement for all its medical 
assistance, not merely that portion of the recipient's recovery designated as 'medical 
expenses'. Accordingly, since the settlement was initiated without the State's consent and 
specifically included medical expenses, the State is entitled to full reimbursement and not 
a proportionate share of the recovery." [Emphasis added.] 
The other case which sheds light on the inquiry came only recently. In State Office of 
Recovery Services v. McCoy, 999 P.2d 572 (Utah 2000), the Medicaid recipient sought to protect 
i private recovery by expressly excluding the State's claim for reimbursement of medical costs. 
rhe recipient's counsel, McCoy, sought approval from the State to pursue its claim but such 
request was denied. Counsel thereupon advised the third parties and their insurance carriers of 
this fact and advised that he did not make any demand for any medical bills that the State had 
paid. 
After the recipient's claim was settled, the State demanded reimbursement of the State lien 
out of the settlement proceeds. The trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment 
and entered judgment for fiill reimbursement. Except for attorney's fees, discussed hereafter, the 
judgment was affirmed. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, Case number 990600417, Page 9-
Unlike Camp, the McCoy court does not focus on the presence or absence of medical 
expenses in the settlement. It is similarly unimpressed with the fact that the private recovery 
specifically excluded medical expenses paid by the State. Rather, the focus is on the State's 
statutory entitlement to full reimbursement out of any and all settlement proceeds. The argument 
that the State would have to pursue its claim against the third parties was rejected. 
'Thus under section 26-19-4 5, the settlement proceeds are assigned by operation of law 
to the State to the extent that the State has provided benefits.. . . Additionally under 
section 26-19-5, the State possesses a lien against the entire settlement proceeds, 
including both the amount designated as medical payment and the amount designated as 
bodily injury payment" 999 P.2d at 575. [Emphasis added.] 
The foregoing makes clear that a recipient cannot insulate settlement proceeds from the. 
State's lien by the manner in which they are labeled. McCoy involved an up-front, outright, fully 
disclosed effort by counsel to structure the settlement so that it did not include any State money. 
Both the State and the third parties' insurance carriers were put on notice. It didn't wort 
McCoy gives full force and effect to UCA §26-19-5(l)(b) which imposes the State's lien "against 
any proceeds payable to or on behalf of the recipient." Were it not so, a recipient could 
unilaterally use up the policy limits, and other resources, and effectively foreclose any hope of 
Medicaid reimbursement without the State so much as being aware. 
B. THE DEFENDANTS5 PREEMPTIVE EFFORT 
The open and candid approach in McCoy is in stark contrast to the facts before this Court. 
When Streight's father, as conservator, first spoke with Sykes and Associates in August of 1998, 
he advised counsel that he had applied for Medicaid. Sykes and Associates advised that they 
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Id get the money into a supplemental needs trust before Medicaid paid the medical bills. (See 
sputed affidavit of Carrie Worthen on file with the Court.) Streight was approved for 
icaid assistance on August 25. Some three weeks later on September 17, a petition to 
•ove settlement with third parties was filed with the Sixth District Court, Sanpete County, civil 
5 no. 983600026. The State was not given notice notwithstanding the recipient's and 
nsel's awareness of its lien and entitlement to reimbursement. 
The petition filed with the court is abbreviated. With respect to the issues of settlement, 
ice and recovery protection, the relevant paragraphs provide: 
4* Claims for compensation have been made against Farm Bureau Insurance Company, 
the insurer for Sherilyn Christenson and against Peggy Sue's policy of Underinsured 
Motorist Coverage with Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Petitioners anticipate that 
both insurers will shortly tender their policy limits of $100,000 and $10,000 respectively, 
and petitioners have agreed, pending the court's approval, to release Peggy Sue Streight's 
claims against Sherilyn Christenson, Farm Bureau Insurance Company and Ohio Casualty 
Insurance Company in exchange for payment of the policy limits. 
6- There are no other persons interested in Peggy Sue's estate, who are entitled to notice 
pursuant to law, other than her natural parents and guardians, Bud and Karen Jensen. 
8- Petition is hereby made for the Court to approve said proposed settlement and place 
the proceeds in a proper vehicle so that they are not deemed to have come into the 
possession of or under the control of Peggy Sue Streight or to be available to her. 
The petition came before the court for hearing on September 23, 1998, six days after it 
;vas filed. The court's order is also abbreviated.2 The relevant paragraph provides: 
2
 The special needs trust is not abbreviated. It is some twenty pages in length and was approved by Judge 
David L. Mower who sat on that occasion. The trust, however, adds nothing to the fact picture in so far as 
revealing what was taking place with respect to notice and settlement of the claims and the interest of the State. 
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3- The Court hereby approves and orders that the proposed settlement in the amount of 
$110,000 is reasonable and approves the same for the benefit of Peggy Sue Streight. 
The recipient and her counsel now seek to hide behind this ill-gotten and essentially ex-
parte approval from a court that was less than fiilly informed. The preemptive strategy cannot be 
allowed to control ultimate entitlements. The statutory penalty for failure to obtain the State's 
written consent before settling a claim or releasing a third party is set forth in UCA §26-19-7(2): 
(a) If the recipient proceeds without the departments written consent as required by 
Subsection (l)(a), the department is not bound by any decision, judgment, agreement, or 
compromise rendered or made on the claim or in the action. 
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party to which the 
proceeds were made payable all medical assistance which it has provided.... [Emphasis 
added] 
The foregoing reveals the futility of the rush to the courthouse. The fact that the 
conservators and counsel attempted to cut the State out prompts reference to a couple of supreme 
court observations in S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998). Regarding the requirement that the 
State's written consent be obtained before a claim is settled, the court states: 
"This provision protects both the liable third party and the State from ill-informed or 
devious actions by the recipient." 972 P.2d at 441; 
and further, 
a[T]he recipient's preemptive action does not cost the State its right to third party 
payments which are in settlement or are already in the hands of the beneficiary." Id at 
442. 
This court concludes that there is no reasonable nor statutory basis for the recipient to 
retain the settlement proceeds except to the extent they exceed the State's reimbursement 
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ititlement of $107,363.70. To the extent the State provided medical assistance, it is entitled to 
II reimbursement and the settlement proceeds received by the recipient are assigned by 
deration of law to the State [§26-19-4 5(l)(a)]. The State has a lien against these proceeds 
J26-19-5(l)(b)] and the State may recover in full from the recipient or any party to which the 
roceeds were made payable [§26-19-7(2)(b)]. 
C. ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Sykes and Associates argues that even if the recipient Streight is obliged to honor the 
State's lien of $107,363.70, the portion paid in fees and costs ($38,030.92), should be exempt 
Reliance is placed upon the decision in McCoy. 
Before examining the impact of McCoy, it is appropriate to look first at the language of 
the statute. The Act provides that in its recovery effort, the State is entitled to the services of its 
own counsel. UCA §26-19-15 provides: "The attorney general or a county attorney shall 
represent the department in any action commenced under this chapter." I construe this as 
language of entitlement rather than limitation. 
The State may also elect to utilize the services of counsel who represent the recipient. 
UCA §26-19-7(3) recognizes the right of the department to join in an action commenced by the 
recipient and rely upon the recipient's private counsel. Apparently this is not an uncommon 
practice. 
State reliance upon private counsel requires a written agreement. Houghton v. 
Department of Health, 962 P.2d 58 (Utah 1998). Coincidentally, the attorneys representing the 
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recipient in that case included Robert B. Sykes and Matthew H. Raty of the law firm of Sykes and 
Vilos. Sykes and Raty represent the recipient in the case now before this court. 
la Houghton, the supreme court noted that counsel had complied with UCA §26-19-
7(l)(a) which required the department's written consent. 962 P.2d at 59-60. Relying on this 
provision and also UCA §26-19-7(3), the court held that "Sykes and VUos were required to enter 
into written agreements with the State's Office of Recovery Services . . . to protect the State's 
interest in obtaining reimbursement from damages awarded against third party defendants and in 
favor of a plaintiff who had received Medicaid payments." Id. at 60. The court went on to state, 
"... Sykes and Vilos were legally obligated under section 26-19-7(3) to sign the agreementsil 
they wished to represent Medicaid recipients in actions against third parties." Id [Emphasis 
added.] 
Houghton is good law. It is supported by the statute and by common sense. There is 
simply no statutory authorization for awarding attorney's fees against the State unless it has given 
its written consent. The result in McCoy allowing attorney's fees in the absence of consent or 
statutory authorization is an aberration and should be limited to its facts. It is the peculiar and 
compelling facts of that case which warrant the equitable result reached rather than the supreme 
court's abbreviated and flawed legal analysis of the statute. 
The McCoy facts are simple. Attorney McCoy contacted the State and requested its 
written consent to allow proceeding with the claim as required by UCA §26-19-7(l)(a). The 
State gave him the proverbial "cold shoulder". McCoy proceeded as best he could to setde his 
EMORANDUM DECISION, Case number 990600417, Page 14-
ient's claim while expressly excluding the State's claim for medical expenses. The negotiated 
sttlement included $5,000 for his client's medical expenses which were above and beyond the 
8,846.92 which the State had paid. When the settlement proceeds were received, McCoy took 
tie precaution of placing in his trust account the amount of the State's claim. The State treated 
his like an open invitation and pursued this money rather than file its own action against the third 
parties. The district court allowed it and the supreme court agreed.3 
The difficulty with the decision as it relates to attorney fees is that in order to reach its 
equitable result, the supreme court engages in a tortured reading of the statute. It focuses only on 
subsection (4) of §26-19-7. It divides this subsection treating the portion before the comma as an 
award clause and the remainder as a clause of limitation. The reverse is more accurate. The first 
clause doesn't contain a single word of authorization. Its operative words are "may not." 
Subsection (3) actually provides the statutory basis for awarding attorney's fees. The first clause 
of subsection (4) is one of limitation; the second is one of award and limitation, but it relates only 
to costs. When subsections (3) and (4) are read together the picture comes readily in focus: 
(3) The department's written consent, if given, shall state under what terms the interests 
of the department may be represented in an action commenced by the recipient. 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for attorney's fees, 
but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action that is commenced with the 
department's written consent. [Emphasis added.] 
The opinion makes clear that the State could have pursued a direct action against the responsible third 
parties. See footnotes 4 and 5, 999 P.2d at 577. These notes also make clear that the State's approach resulted in a 
direct loss to the recipient to the full extent of the $8,846.92 grabbed by the State. 
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Read in tandem and in light of the court's decision in Houghton, these provisions make 
clear that attorney's fees and costs can be awarded only in the context of actions where the State 
gives written consent and then the fees are limited to 33% of the department's total recovery. 
Were it not so, Houghton }s requirement of a written agreement between the State and private 
counsel would be meaningless. 
Recognizing the role of this court and its relationship to the supreme court, I would not be 
so bold in critiquing McCoy and suggesting it be limited to its facts were the considerations less 
compelling. Should this matter subsequently find its way to the high court, the four points 
discussed hereafter should be carefully considered. 
First, the McCoy majority is not able to identify a clear contractual or statutory basis for 
an award of attorney's fees. It glides past this, stretching subsection (4) beyond what the words 
allow. The real basis for the court's ruling is found in this language: "[I]t would be inherently 
unfair not to award attorney's fees to McCoy who has followed the requirements of the act in 
securing recovery on behalf of his client." 999 P.2d at 576. The finding of unfairness recognizes 
that the State did nothing affirmative. It denied consent, declined to participate and then took 
advantage of the recovery to the injury of the recipient. Its approach is reminiscent of the farm 
animals in the story of The Little Red Hen. There is precious little equity in that.4 
4
 Sykes and Associates claim equity is also on its side. It claims this was a difficult case, rejected by other 
lawyers, and that it performed superior legal work in achieving an advantageous settlement It may be so, but 
failure to contact the State and the determined effort to preclude rather than assist State recovery distinguishes it 
from McCoy and compromises an equity claim. It is left to the State to determine if the services are worthy of 
compensation and whether some basis exists other than the Medical Benefits Recovery Act 
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Second, and of compelling importance, neither the majority opinion nor the dissent 
isidered the precedents established in Camp and Houghton. Remarkably, the McCoy court 
served, ". . . [T]he State provides no statutory, case law or policy basis for limiting awards of 
orney's fees to those recipients to whom the State, at its discretion, grants consent." 999 P.2d 
576-577. Why Camp and Houghton were overlooked is a mystery. Camp discussed the 
ecise issue at stake in McCoy. The court in Camp observed: 
The State argues that Camp is not entitled to any State contribution for costs and 
fees because Camp did not have the State's consent as required under subsection 26-19-
7(2). 
. . . [W]e are inclined to agree that the commencement of an action without State 
consent would rule out a State contribution for costs and attorney's fees. We believetlat 
this interpretation is consistent with the apparent legislative intent to prevent Medicaid 
recipients from obtaining double recovery. Otherwise, recipients would be rewarded for 
proceeding in contravention of this statute.... 
Utah continues to adhere to the general rale that attorney's fees are recoverable 
only under contractual or statutory provision. [Citation omitted.] Although subsection 26-
19-7(4) may authorize an award of attorney's fees to some Medicaid recipients, the fees 
must be in connection with the commencement of an action and the action must be 
commenced with the State's written consent79 779 P.2d at 247,248. [Emphasis added.] 
Third, the attorney's fee issue in McCoy was decided on a three to two vote. The 
dissenters correctly note the absence of a statutory or contractual basis on which to award 
attorney's fees and correctly, in my view, construe subsection (4) as one of limitation rather than 
award. I consider it likely that this view will carry when the subject is given full reconsideration. 
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Fourth and filially, from a pure policy standpoint, there are clear reasons not to follow 
McCoy, or at least to limit any precedential value to its peculiar facts, la McCoy, the State was 
put on notice and had the option of joining in or allowing the process to unfold as it did. The 
recipient's counsel did ail he could to induce a cooperative effort. Allowing recovery of 
attorney's fees in cases where there is not even a request made for State consent would place in 
the hands of private counsel the unilateral decision of who represents the State and the terms of 
settlement. There would be no assurance of protection of the State's claim. The State's statutory 
entitlement to rely upon the attorney general or the county attorney [UCA §26-19-5] would be 
rendered meaningless. Moreover, the requirement of UCA §26-19-7(l)(a) that no action be filed 
without the State's written consent would be thoroughly undermined and lawyers eager to handle 
such cases would be rewarded for disregarding the law. The language of the Houghton court 
regarding the necessity of a written agreement between the State and private counsel would have 
no effect. 
It is my considered view that the supreme court must abandon or refine its decision in 
McCoy regarding attorney's fees and must examine UCA §26-19-7 in its entirety. It must 
construe and give meaning to subsection (4) not as an island but as it relates to subsection (3) and 
the other provisions which expressly require the State's written consent. If counsel pursues a 
claim against a third party on behalf of a recipient who has received Medicaid, the State's written 
consent is a statutory prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees out of the State's share. Any 
other conclusion cannot long survive without encouraging serious mischief. 
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For the reasons aforesaid, I am compelled to conclude that the State's lien under UCA 
-19-5(l)(b) follows the proceeds into the hands of Sykes and Associates and under §26-19-
)(b), counsel must remit them to the State. 
D. PREEMPTION UNDER THE FEDERAL ANTI-LIEN STATUTE 
Defendants argue that federal law preempts the priority status assigned to the State's lien, 
timing that it amounts to a recovery from the recipient's own damages. Reliance is placed upon 
: USC §1396p(a)(l) and (b)(1). Defendants freely acknowledge that the Utah Supreme Court 
\s held that the State's lien on proceeds payable to the recipient do not violate the federal anti-
sn provision. There is no conflict because the lien is not on the recipient's property, but on 
rttlement proceeds in the hands of a third party. Wallace v. Estate of Jackson, 972 P.2d 446, 
Utah 1998).5 
Defendants' acknowledgment is hollow because they turn around and argue that the 
>roceeds are identified and become the property of the recipient before State reimbursement. 
Defendants' position is simply a refusal to acknowledge the holding in Wallace and an identical 
holding in S.S. decided the same day as Wallace, and in McCoy. McCoy brings the holdings in all 
three cases together in a simple sentence: 
S.S. and Wallace held that under the Act, any third party recovery does not become the 
"property" of the recipient until the recipient has reimbursed the State for all medical 
assistance the State provided. 999 P.2d at 575. 
The firm of Sykes and Associates was counsel for the private recipient in Wallace. 
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What this means here is that of the $110,000 received by Straight, 5107,363.70 is not her 
property. With respect to the balance, small though it may be, there is no issue. 
E. PAYMENTS AFTER ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST 
Defendants make the argument that the State's reimbursement entitlement is limited to 
payments actually made prior to establishment of the special needs trust. Reliance is placed upon 
an analysis of 42 USC §1396p(d)(4)(A) and UCA §62A-5-l 10. The relationship between these 
statutes was carefully considered by the S.S. court. It found no irreconcilable conflict between the 
two. 
Thus we may conclude without doing violence to either statute, that recoveries from third 
parties liable for the same expenses covered by Medicaid belong to the State, but any 
remaining balance not owed to the State may be used to fund a properly structured 
supplemental needs trust. 972 P.2d at 443. 
The import of this provision is clear. The timing of the payment is not the controlling factor. The 
recovery simply "belongs to the State" until it is made whole with "any remaining balance" 
available for the trust. These statements are so clear that they overcome a single clause elsewhere 
in the opinion on which these defendants rely. That clause appears in the context of the following 
paragraph: 
Payments made by a third party do not legally become the property of the recipient until 
after a valid settlement, which necessarily must include reimbursement to Medicaid. 
Therefore, we hold that the State has a valid assignment and an enforceable right against 
third party recoveries for S.S.'s injury up to the amount of Medicaidassistance paidas of 
the time of the settlement approval P.2d 972 at 442. 
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Defendants necessarily craft their whole argument by isolating from context the 
flighted language and a clause which appears in Wallace. The answer to the highlighted 
iguage out of the S.S. opinion is that it simply fit the facts of the case. The State's Medicaid 
sistance had been fully expended as of the time of settlement. The amount of necessary 
jimbursement was fixed. The language in question is preceded by the provision that payments 
o not belong to the recipient "until after" Medicaid reimbursement. If that is not clear enough, 
onsider the following, also from S.S.: 
We therefore hold that repayment of the Medicaid lien from third party settlement funds 
must precede creation of the supplemental needs trust. Id at 443. [Emphasis added.] 
Wallace is equally clear. The language defendants rely on (highlighted) is buried at the 
end of a paragraph, which, taken as a whole, reveals its lack of support for defendants' position: 
[The recipient] next contends that both federal and state statutes explicitly allow a 
personal injury victim to put proceeds from a personal injury settlement into a special 
needs trust and thereby avoid any claim by the State for Medicaid reimbursement. This 
same issue was raised in S.S. v State. There we held that repayment of the Medicaid lien 
from third party settlement funds must precede the creation of the supplemental needs 
trust. That holding is controlling here; once a trust is created, the State cannot make any 
demand upon it during [the recipient 'sj lifetime. 972 P.2d at 448. [Emphasis added.] 
In the case at issue, the medical treatment and services rendered Streight were between 
June 10 and October 16, 1998. She was in a coma for some 2 Vi weeks and hospitalized for 
several weeks. The special needs trust was established with court approval on September 23, but 
was accomplished without notice to or awareness of the State. It clearly appears to have been a 
preemptive strike to lay a foundation for the argument now advanced. Since it was not preceded 
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by repayment of the Medicaid lien, the special needs trust affords no protection to the settlement 
proceeds. 
F. ABSENCE OF MATERIAL FACT ISSUES 
At oral argument, defendants undertook to specifically identify material issues of feet 
which they claim should be submitted to a jury. The effort falls short. The claimed issues are 
either non-issues or are irrelevant. Each will be examined. 
1 - Did Streight settle any claim for medical expenses assigned to the State ? Under both 
Camp and McCoy, the inquiry is irrelevant. The State's lien attaches to all proceeds from third 
parties regardless of how they are labeled. UCA § 26-19-5(l)(b). Moreover, Straight's petition 
in the district court indicates release of all claims for policy limits. There was no indication of an 
exemption or reservation for medical expense paid by the State. If there were an issue, it would 
be legal rather than factual and it would relate to the third parties not to Streight. The recovery in 
the hands of Streight is subject to the State lien. 
2- Did the third parties know of the State's lien? If the answer is no, then the third 
parties are not to be faulted for settling directly with Streight for policy limits. If the answer is 
yes, the State may be able to pursue further recovery from the third parties who would then have 
recourse against Streight. Either way, Streight can't keep the proceeds. The statutory scheme is 
designed to "protect both the liable third party and the State from ill-informed or devious actions 
by the recipient." S.S., 972 P.2d at 441. As heretofore discussed, Streight's trust cannot be 
funded until after State reimbursement. 
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3- Did the State lose its lien by delay in pursuing recovery? Finding "delay" would be a 
[ stretch. Streight's application/questionnaire filed by her father on June 26, 1998, identified 
tortfeasor and named an insurance company. Streight was still in a coma and continued to 
eive covered medical care through Oct. 16. Actual payments by the State for the medical care 
ntinued into the next January. Meanwhile on Sept. 17, Streight's conservators clandestinely 
titioned the district court and on Sept. 23, received approval to settle her claims. It is against 
is backdrop that the claim is made that the State delayed too long in pursuing recovery from 
ird parties thereby justifying defendants' preemptive action. Defendants would have the State's 
sn lost before it matured and without demonstrating any injury from the so-called "delay." 
reasonable minds could not so conclude. Moreover, recovery from third parties is not at issue. 
!ven if that were somehow compromised, it does not compromise the right of recovery from 
itreight. The fact remains that the State's iien against proceeds in the hands of Streight arises 
>oth by "operation of law", UCA § 26-19-4.5(l)(a), and by assignment contained in the 
ipplication for medical assistance duly executed by Streight's father on Aug. 3. The assignment 
contains no expiration language and clearly has life beyond court approval of settlement and 
beyond the recipient's collection from responsible parties. 
In consideration of Medical Assistance, I assign to the Utah Department of Health all my 
rights to medical benefits, I authorize payment of the benefits directly to the Department 
of Health. If the Utah Department of Health pays for my medical care, I will give them 
any money I collect from an insurance policy. I will also give them any money I collect 
from someone liable for my medical expenses. I agree to hold harmless any person or 
organization making payment to the Department of Health because of this agreement. 
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4- Did the conservators provide the required level of cooperation? The duty of 
cooperation by the recipient was reinforced in McCoy. It is designed "to assist the State in 
pursuing any third party who may be liable to pay for medical care and services." McCoy, 999 
P.2d at 577, footnote 4. Defendants have a distorted view of cooperation, its purpose and 
duration. They suggest the duty was fulfilled by the June 26, disclosure of the name of the 
tortfeasor and her insurance carrier. From this modest effort, they claim license to proceed 
forthwith to unilaterally and secretly settle with the tortfeasor and the insurance carriers for policy 
limits designing thereby to short-circuit rather than assist recovery by the State. It was 
tantamount to a treasure hunt where the organizer provides the clues and then runs ahead to seize 
the prize before the others can get there. It becomes a non-issue here because recovery has been 
obtained from the third parties and the State's lien follows the proceeds into the hands of the 
recipient, UCA § 26-19-7(2)(b), and on into the trust. UCA § 26-19-5(6) ["The department's 
lien on proceeds under this section is npt affected by the transfer of the proceeds to a trust —." ] 
5- When did the State find Streight eligible and how much had the State paid out at the 
time Streight settled the claim? Defendants have failed to show that these are issues or that they 
are material. The undisputed documentary evidence shows State Medicaid approval on Aug. 25, 
and State payments of some $58,000 by the end of September with court approval having come 
on Sept. 23. Defendants mistakenly assume that the rush to the courthouse cut off the State's 
reimbursement entitlement thereby rendering these dates and amounts material. It is not so. The 
lien arises by operation of law if the State "provides or becomes obligated to provide7' Medicaid 
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sistance, UCA § 26-19-4.5(l)(a). The lien is forward looking. Further, the assignment by the 
mservators was open-ended without expiration and cannot be unilaterally canceled while the 
tate continues to pay the medical providers. The absurdity of the defendant's position is 
pparent in the whole of the prior legal analysis. It would serve no useful purpose to revisit that 
iscussion. 
G. FIRST PARTY UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE 
At oral argument, defendants advanced the proposition that the $10,000 underinsured 
motorist recovery should be exempt from the State's lien. The rationale is that this did not come 
from a responsible "third party" but rather from a first party insurance carrier to whom Streigbt, 
or the conservators, had paid a premium. The position has a certain appeal and may cany absent 
the clear language of the statute and the assignment in favor of the State. 
The statute grants the State direct right of recovery from ua third party obligated to pa/* 
for medical assistance. UCA § 26-19-5 (l)(a). The statute contains its own expansive definition 
of "third party." It covers what defendants style as a first party relationship: 
UCA § 26-19-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(8) "Third party includes: 
(a) an individual, institution, corporation, public or private agency, trust, estate, 
insurance carrier, employee welfare benefit plan, health maintenance organization, 
health service organization, preferred provider organization, governmental 
program such as Medicare, CHAMPUS, and workers' compensation, which may 
be obligated to pay ail or part of the medical costs of injury, disease, or disability 
of a recipient, unless any of these are excluded by department rule; . . . . 
MEMORANDUM DECISION. Case number 990600417, Paee 25-
Moreover, under the terms of the assignment, the conservators on behalf of Streight, 
promised: "I will also give them any money I collect from an insurance policy. I will also give 
them any money I collect from someone liable for my medical expenses." 
H. PARTIAL vs. COMPLETE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
At oral argument, the court made inquiry as to the basis for seeking partial as opposed to 
complete summary judgment. Plaintiffs counsel explained that the State may need to pursue post 
judgment remedies to trace disposition of the proceeds that Streight received from the insurance 
carriers. Such is not now before the Court and does not prevent the granting of complete 
summary judgment. Those issues may never arise. The Court assumes the parties will comply 
with the judgment entered and it need not anticipate or speculate about potential enforcement or 
collection problems. The case is ripe for complete summary judgment. Anything less would not 
serve the interests of the parties. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
I conclude that defendants' effort to quickly and quietly place the third party payments 
beyond the reach of the State was an exercise in futility. The rush to the courthouse does not 
preempt the State's claim. The payments, however labeled in the settlement, are not the property 
of the recipient but belong to the State until full Medicaid reimbursement. The State's lien 
follows the proceeds into the hands of other parties. Satisfaction of the Medicaid lien must 
precede establishment of a special needs trust. After such satisfaction, any remaining sums may 
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jsed to fund the trust. The State may give written consent to its interests being pursued by the 
dicaid recipient and private counsel. Such written consent is a necessary prerequisite for the 
ment of attorney's fees of up to 33% from the State's share of the recovery. 
The State's motion is treated as a motion for complete summary judgment. It is granted. 
ere are no material issues of fact. The State is entitled to full reimbursement of $107,363.70 
jether with interest. Counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate judgment in accordance with 
s decision and the rules. 
Dated this l(D day of May, 2001. 
District 
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